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Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence that security analysts do not efficiently
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1 Introduction
This study provides evidence on the role of macroeconomic information in analysts’
earnings forecasts in emerging markets. Specifically we investigate whether analysts
incorporate forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as output, inflation and
political stability into their firm-level earnings forecasts in an efficient way. Finding
that this is not the case, we examine whether analysts actually ignore valuable
information for corporate earnings provided by these macroeconomic forecasts, or
whether they include irrelevant information.
Security analysts are potential intermediaries in the process of information dis-
closure. Their role as producers of firm-specific information has been widely inves-
tigated for developed markets, see Brown (1978) and O’Brien (1988), among many
others. In emerging markets, the availability of firm-specific information is hampered
for a variety of reasons, such as the limited set of regulations on public information
disclosure or the lack of enforcement thereof, see Morck et al. (2000), Bae et al.
(2006) and Bae et al. (in press), among others. In that light it is perhaps not sur-
prising that Chan and Hameed (2006) find that, through their earnings forecasts
for emerging market stocks, analysts actually produce market-wide information in-
stead of revealing firm-specific news. This naturally leads to the question whether
analysts base their earnings forecasts on firm-specific information only, or whether
they also make use of macroeconomic information. The use of the latter type of
information can be justified if the difficulties associated with the collection of firm-
specific information also apply to security analysts. If this is the case, a natural
follow-up question would be if analysts use the macroeconomic information in the
best possible way.
In this paper we examine the role of macroeconomic information in analysts
earnings forecasts as follows. We start with investigating whether earnings forecast
errors are uncorrelated with publicly available macroeconomic information. This
should be the case if analysts incorporate such information in their earnings forecasts
efficiently. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of macroeconomic
information in explaining analyst forecast bias. Notable exception is O’Brien (1994),
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who finds that US macroeconomic news explains a significant part of the variation in
US corporate earnings and that macroeconomic news that arrives after the earnings
forecast issuance is reflected in analysts’ forecast errors. More recently Basu et al.
(2006) find that analysts do not fully include inflation survey forecasts in their
earnings forecasts for US stocks. Our study is the first to comprehensively investigate
the relationship between earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts in emerging
markets. Furthermore, in addition to inflation forecasts as in Basu et al. (2006),
we include forecasts of real output growth and the outlook on political stability,
in order to capture a more comprehensive assessment of the overall macroeconomic
situation in a given emerging market. In our analysis we control for well-documented
“micro”-information determinants of analysts’ earnings forecasts, including market
capitalization (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Lim, 2001), analyst coverage (Lim, 2001;
Chan and Hameed, 2006) and, in particular, prior-year earnings (Abarbanell and
Bernard, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999).
Our analysis provides convincing evidence that analysts do not make efficient use
of macroeconomic forecasts for their earnings forecasts of emerging market compa-
nies. Controlling for firm characteristics, we find that the earnings forecast error is
significantly related to forecasts of output growth and political stability, which are
available at the time when the earnings forecast was made. Earnings forecast errors
are not related to inflation forecasts, suggesting that the information in this variable
is correctly incorporated in the earnings forecasts.
The finding that analysts do not exploit macroeconomic forecasts in an optimal
way can arise for two different reasons: Either analysts ignore valuable macroeco-
nomic information or they take irrelevant information into account when producing
their earnings forecasts. In the second step of our analysis, we distinguish between
these competing explanations by examining how actual earnings growth and earn-
ings forecasts are related to the macroeconomic forecasts. We find that the political
stability forecasts do contain useful information for realized earnings, but this is ig-
nored completely by the analysts. Although we find a positive association between
actual corporate earnings growth and actual output growth, there is no such rela-
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tion between earnings growth and output growth forecasts. Hence, the quality of
these forecasts does not seem sufficient to provide a useful source of information for
firm-level earnings. Analysts, however, overreact and adjust their earnings forecasts
in the opposite direction.
In addition, we document the importance of the information environment in
emerging markets by distinguishing between companies with high and low trans-
parency. This is done according to two transparency measures: the availability of an
ADR listing, following Lang et al. (2003) and Baker et al. (2002), and the time that
it takes a company to release its annual report, where stocks releasing their annual
report within three months after the end of the prior fiscal year are labeled as ‘fast
reporting’ and all other stocks as ‘slow reporting’. Our results clearly demonstrate
that analysts handle macroeconomic information in a better way for more trans-
parent firms. This confirms the finding of Lim (2001) for US stocks that analysts’
earnings forecast bias is related to the information uncertainty environment, and in
fact expands the study by documenting this effect for macroeconomic information.
Our findings contribute to earlier research on emerging markets in several ways.
First, concerning the role of analysts in the information production process in emerg-
ing markets, our study provides a possible explanation for Chan and Hameed’s (2006)
finding that analysts produce market-wide information by showing that analysts in-
corporate both inflation and output forecasts in their earnings forecasts. Our study
also shows that it is in fact rational for analysts to include such market-wide infor-
mation in their forecasts as we find a direct relationship between earnings growth
and macroeconomic developments in emerging markets. Second, regardless of the
role of macroeconomic information, our results show that firm transparency is still
key for analysts to come up with accurate earnings forecasts. This should stimulate
policy-makers in emerging markets to work on their regulations concerning informa-
tion disclosure, and should also provide an incentive for companies to increase their
transparency. Third, our findings provide evidence on the importance of political
stability in emerging markets. Prior studies by Claessens et al. (in press), among
others, uncover a negative relationship between political connections and output
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growth for one specific country. Our study demonstrates for a large cross-section of
emerging markets that countries benefit from increased political stability in terms
of higher earnings growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our
research methodology in detail and describe the data set. In Section 3 we report our
main empirical findings. In Section 4 we provide additional results that demonstrate
the robustness of our results. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Methodology and Data
We investigate the role of macroeconomic information in analysts’ earnings forecasts
for individual companies in emerging markets. In particular, we examine whether
analysts make efficient use of forecasts concerning key macroeconomic variables when
producing their earnings forecasts. In this section, we first describe and motivate
our methodology to address this issue. In the remainder of this section, we discuss
the variables used in our analysis.
2.1 Methodology
Our analysis is focused on the analysts’ earnings forecast error FEit, which we
define as a percentage of the stock price at the time the forecast is made, following
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Lim (2001), among
others, that is
FEit =
Eit − Êit
Pit
, (1)
where Eit is the realized earnings per share in local currency for firm i in fiscal year
t, Êit is the consensus analysts’ earnings forecast made six months prior to the end
of the year,1 and Pit is the local stock price at the time the forecast is made. The
consensus earnings forecast is defined as the median forecast reported for a specific
company in a given month.
If analysts efficiently incorporate macroeconomic information into their earnings
forecasts, the forecast error FEit should be uncorrelated with any such information
1The reasons for choosing a six month forecast horizon are discussed in Section 2.2.
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available to the analysts at the time their forecasts are made. This macroeconomic
information may, for example, come in the form of the actual values of variables
such as output growth and inflation in the previous fiscal year t− 1. However, it is
quite likely that analysts would attempt to incorporate more timely information, for
example by considering forecasts of these same variables for the current fiscal year
t, for which they are supposed to produce earnings forecasts. Hence, in the analysis
below we specifically consider the question whether analysts efficiently handle in-
formation that is available in forecasts for macroeconomic variables for the current
year.
In examining this issue, we account for the fact that various company charac-
teristics may explain part of the systematic variation in earnings forecast errors, as
documented by Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Lang and Lundholm (1996), East-
erwood and Nutt (1999), Lim (2001), and Chan and Hameed (2006), among others.
As we use the consensus forecast we ignore analyst characteristics such as age and
experience, which also have been shown to be correlated with earnings forecast er-
rors, see Jacob et al. (1995) and Mikhail et al. (2003), for example. Hence, we
estimate the following regression model:
FEit = α +
∑
j
βjM̂jt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit, (2)
where M̂jt is the forecast of the j-th macroeconomic variable for fiscal year t and Sjt
is the j-th stock specific variable. The particular variables we use for the macroeco-
nomic forecasts and company characteristics are explained in detail below. Here it is
useful to note that we make sure that both M̂jt and Sjt are available to the analysts
six months prior to the end of fiscal year t, when the earnings forecasts are made.
Efficient use of the information in the macroeconomic forecasts by security analysts
for their earnings forecasts is equivalent to the null hypothesis that the coefficients
βj in (2) are equal to zero.
It is important to note that finding a relationship between the earnings forecast
errors and macroeconomic forecasts in (2) does not necessarily imply that analysts
actually ignore valuable macroeconomic information. Systematic forecast bias may
also occur because analysts incorporate irrelevant macroeconomic information into
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their earnings forecasts. We attempt to distinguish between these competing ex-
planations by examining how the actual earnings growth as well as the earnings
forecasts are related to the macroeconomic forecasts. Specifically, we estimate the
following regressions:
Eit − Ei,t−1
Pit
= α+
∑
j
βjM̂jt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit, (3)
Êit − Ei,t−1
Pit
= α+
∑
j
βjM̂jt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit. (4)
The models in (3) and (4) obviously are identical to (2), except that the actual change
in earnings and the earnings growth forecast, respectively, replace the earnings fore-
cast error as dependent variable. The model in (3) measures whether the available
macroeconomic forecasts are relevant for actual earnings growth and, hence, whether
analysts should take this information into account in their earnings forecasts. The
model in (4) assesses to what extent analysts do indeed incorporate the macroeco-
nomic forecasts into their earnings forecasts. If the coefficients βj are equal to zero
in (3) but differ from zero in (4), the analysts ignore valuable information in the
macroeconomic forecasts. In the opposite case, the analysts do take the macroeco-
nomic forecasts into account, but this information actually is irrelevant for earnings
growth.
Although the models in (2), (3) and (4) are linear regressions, we do not use
ordinary least squares (OLS) for parameter estimation. Especially due to the oc-
currence of emerging markets’ crises, outliers in both the realized earnings change
and the forecast error as well as in the macroeconomic forecasts are present. OLS
estimates are unduly influenced by such aberrant observations, which are extremely
large and quite pervasive in samples such as ours. At the same time, given the
more erratic behavior of emerging markets, we do not want to follow the common
practice of trimming or removing outliers from the sample altogether. Instead we
use a robust estimation method similar to Chan and Lakonishok (1992) to estimate
(2) and all subsequent regressions. Specifically, we use Huber (1981)’s Generalized
M-estimator, which downweights observations with extremely large values of the
residual, the regressor, or both. We refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of
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this estimation method. Throughout we compute heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors and corresponding t-statistics to account for variation in uncertainty of
the forecast (errors) across firms and over time.
2.2 Analysts’ earnings forecasts
We obtain consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts and the corresponding actual earn-
ings from Institutional Brokers Estimate Systems (I/B/E/S) International Inc. This
data source has been used in the majority of studies on analysts’ earnings forecasts
in developed markets. The consensus forecast is defined as the median of all individ-
ual analysts’ forecasts reported by I/B/E/S six months before the end of the fiscal
year.
Our sample consists of all listed firms included in the S&P/ International Finance
Corporation (IFC) Investable Composite index during the period 1991 - 2005.2 All
stocks in the S&P/IFC Investable Composite Index are open to foreign investors.
For each country in the index Standard & Poor’s selects stocks in order of liquidity
until a coverage of 70-80% of the total market capitalization is reached. A review of
the index constituents is conducted once per year.3
For each company forecast to be included in our data set we require the avail-
ability of (i) a six month ahead consensus forecast of the annual earnings per share
in local currency for the current fiscal year t, (ii) actual earnings per share for years
t − 2 through t, and (iii) stock prices in local currency from the end of year t − 1
2The S&P/IFC Investable Composite Index consists of stocks from the following countries, with
the first month of inclusion in parenthesis. In case two months are provided, the second indicates
the last month of inclusion. Countries can be removed from the index when S&P/IFC no longer
classifies a stock market as ‘emerging’. Countries can also be added to the index when they become
‘emerging’. Latin America: Argentina (Dec 1988), Brazil (Dec 1988), Chile (Dec 1988), Colombia
(Feb 1991 - Nov 2001), Mexico (Dec 1988), Peru (Jan 1994), Venezuela (Jan 1990 - Nov 2001);
Asia: China (Oct 1995), India (Nov 1992), Indonesia (Sep 1990), Korea (Jan 1992), Malaysia (Dec
1988), Pakistan (Mar 1991 Nov 2001), Philippines (Dec 1988), Sri Lanka (Jan 1994 - Nov 2001),
Taiwan (Jan 1991), Thailand (Dec 1988); Europe: Czech Republic (Jan 1996), Greece (Dec 1988
- Apr 2001), Hungary (Apr 1994), Poland (Apr 1994), Portugal (Dec 1988 - Mar 1999), Russia
(Nov 1997), Slovakia (Nov 1997 - Nov 2001), Turkey (Aug 1989); Africa & Middle East: Egypt
(Nov 1997), Israel (Dec 1996), Jordan (Dec 1988 - Nov 2001), Morocco (Nov 1997), South Africa
(Apr 1995), and Zimbabwe (Apr 1994 - Nov 2001). I/B/E/S data is not available for Jordan and
Zimbabwe.
3Stocks that have a trading volume below US$ 15 million or an investable market capitalization
that falls below US$ 75 million are dropped from the index.
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to six months prior to the end of year t. For several reasons our sample selection
rules differ somewhat from those typically applied in comparable studies for the US
and other developed markets. First and foremost, we adopt a six month forecast
horizon in order to be reasonably certain that the security analysts have access to
the previous year’s earnings figures when they make their forecast for the current
fiscal year. For developed markets a longer horizon of eight months is often used, see
Easterwood and Nutt (1999), among others. However, we observe that four months
into the current fiscal year, the previous year’s earnings are reported in the I/B/E/S
database for only 62 percent of the firms included in our sample. This increases to
an acceptable 89 percent after six months.
Second, we do not require a minimum number of analysts providing an earnings
forecast, which is customary for developed markets. Requiring analyst coverage to
be at least four, as in Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Loh and Mian (2003), among
others, would reduce the number of observations in our sample with no less than 21
percent. More importantly, we do not observe a clear difference in the properties of
forecast errors for firms with analyst coverage above and below four.
Third, we do not impose any minimum stock price restrictions, like Lim (2001),
as this would exclude complete countries due to high inflation in the past, while
these low prices generally do not lead to extreme forecast errors.
Finally, on purpose we do not narrow the sample by default restrictions on the
maximum forecast error, as it is likely that not all extreme forecast errors originate
from data errors but also from stock market crises and bankruptcies. Our approach
to deal with these observations is as follows. All absolute forecast errors larger
than 100 percent are flagged as ‘extremes’ and checked manually with the help
of additional pricing data from Factset and Worldscope and price-to-earnings data
from IFC and Worldscope. Only if an extreme value can clearly be explained in
terms of data errors it is adjusted, otherwise it is kept unchanged. This leads to a
maximum forecast error of 320 percent and a minimum of −910 percent. In general,
the extremes are observed during stock market crises when the substantial drops in
stock prices ‘blow up’ earnings forecast errors, and during bankruptcies when, often
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unexpectedly, the actual losses are severe. We deal with the remaining extremes by
using robust regression methods, as explained before.
Our final sample consists of 10,102 firm-year observations, for 1973 unique firms
from 29 different countries. Each firm is on average (median) 5 (4) times included
in the sample. A total of 78 percent of the firm-year observations have fiscal years
ending in December. Observations with the end of the fiscal year in March and June
cover 10 and 7 percent of the sample, respectively, and concern a small number of
countries, in particular South-Africa, Pakistan, India and Malaysia.
2.3 Macroeconomic variables
Our choice of macroeconomic variables Mjt to be included in the regression models
above is guided by the idea that security analysts likely attempt to obtain a com-
prehensive assessment of the overall macroeconomic situation in a given emerging
market. Hence, we include forecasts of three key macroeconomic variables: output
growth, inflation, and a measure of political stability.
Forecasts for these macroeconomic variables can be obtained in various differ-
ent ways. We decide to include survey forecasts instead of, for example, forecasts
obtained from time series regression models for two reasons. First, the exact publi-
cation date of survey forecasts is generally easy to retrieve, which avoids the delicate
issue of uncertain publication lags of actual macroeconomic variables. Second, survey
forecasts are not subject to revisions. Both these points are important for identifying
exactly which macroeconomic information is public and available to analysts at the
time they make their earnings forecasts. In addition, the use of survey forecasts over
other forecasts methods is motivated by studies such as Ang et al. (2007), who find
that survey forecasts of inflation are superior over alternative forecasting methods.
We use output and inflation forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. and the
political risk index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by
Political Risk Services. Both sources provide monthly updates without any publi-
cation delay and without revisions after the initial publication. Further details are
provided below. Finally, we obtain corresponding actual values of output growth
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and inflation from the Economist Intelligence Unit and IFS databases, respectively.4
2.3.1 Output growth
Output growth is the most natural measure of the state of the economy, and seems of
obvious importance for corporate earnings growth. In addition, Ackert and Hunter
(1995) uncover a positive and significant relationship between future earnings fore-
cast errors and past output growth for US stocks.
The output growth forecasts from Consensus Economics have an identical set-up
as our I/B/E/S earnings forecasts. On a monthly (or bi-monthly during the first few
years of our sample period) basis professional forecasters are polled their forecast for
principal macroeconomic variables for the current and following (calendar) year. We
include the consensus forecast for real GDP growth for the current year as issued in
June, that is six months before the end of the year, corresponding with the earnings
forecast horizon. Recall that the large majority of earnings forecasts in our sample
concern fiscal years which coincide with calendar years. The consensus forecast
is a simple arithmetic average of all individual forecasts. Consensus Economics
started collecting survey forecasts for a few developed countries in 1989, expanding
its sample to include emerging markets gradually in subsequent years. For this
reason our emerging markets coverage is not complete, but still satisfactory at 89
percent.
2.3.2 Inflation
Inflation is included following the findings of O’Brien (1994), Ackert and Hunter
(1995) and Basu et al. (2006) for the US market. Ackert and Hunter (1995) doc-
ument no relationship between earnings forecast errors and inflation, which leads
them to conclude that analysts rationally include inflation forecasts in their earn-
ings forecasts. The conclusion of Basu et al. (2006) is opposite, as their findings
indicate that analysts do not fully account for the information in inflation forecasts
in their earnings forecasts. Basu et al. (2006) explain these differences by cross-
4We use IFS line 64F for the CPI. The Economist Intelligence Unit real GDP data is identical
to GDP-at-constant-prices in IFS line 99.
10
sectional heterogeneity in earnings exposures to inflation as documented by Chordia
and Shivakumar (2005). The inflation forecast is constructed in the same way as the
real GDP growth forecast, that is, we include the consensus forecast for the current
year as issued in June.
2.3.3 Political risk
The political environment is generally believed to be important in emerging markets.
Fisman (2001), for example, shows that about 25 percent of the value of Indonesian
firms is related to political connections. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) also analyse
the role of political connections in Indonesia and conclude that firms with political
connections dislike transparency. Claessens et al. (in press) show that the economic
costs of political connections in Brazil lower GDP with 0.2% per annum. For this
reason we analyse the role of politics in the earnings forecasts. We hypothesize a
positive effect of political stability on earnings growth.
Quantifying the political situation in a country is a delicate issue, because it
entails many facets. The ICRG publishes monthly survey data on 12 political factors,
which are aggregated into a single political risk index. The index varies between 0
and 100, where a low score indicates high political uncertainty and a high score
an investor friendly and stable political environment.5 Each factor is assigned a
numerical rating within a specified range, where the allowed range reflects the weight
attributed to a factor. We refer to Erb et al. (1996), Bilson et al. (2002) and Harvey
(2004) for more detailed discussion of the political risk index and its relevance for
emerging stock markets. The index is available for all observations in our sample.
The average score is 68.3 and is quite stable over time. The Philippines’s score in
1991 of 41 is the lowest, while the 1998 and 1999 scores for Portugal (91) are the
highest. We use the actual change in the political risk index between the end of
the previous fiscal year t − 1 and six months into the current fiscal year t as the
political risk forecast. Hence, essentially we assume that the political situation does
not change in the remaining six months of year t.
5Besides political risk the ICRG also publishes economic and financial risk measures.
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2.3.4 Accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts
Obviously the quality of the macroeconomic forecasts partly determines their useful-
ness for analysts earnings forecasts. Accurate forecasts of GDP growth, inflation and
the political situation should provide more information than poor forecasts. Figure
1 provides a graphical impression of the quality of the macroeconomic forecasts by
showing scatterplots of the forecasts against the corresponding realizations for each
country-year observation in our sample. The graphs also include the results of a
standard least squares regression of the actual value of the macroeconomic indicator
M in year t on its forecast made six years before the end of the year for country k:
Mkt = α + βM̂kt + ηkt. (5)
Figure 1(a) shows that analysts are too pessimistic about real GDP growth, given
the slope of 1.06, but that otherwise forecasts for the GDP are of reasonably good
quality given the R2 of 0.71. For both CPI inflation (Figure 1b) and the change in the
political situation (Figure 1c), analysts are too optimistic with slopes of respectively
0.90 and 0.95. Especially the forecast for inflation is good given the R2 of 0.81, while
the R2 of the regression for the change in the political situation is 0.53. From this
we conclude that the quality of the macroeconomic forecast is good enough to use
in our analysis.
- insert Figure 1 about here -
2.4 Company-specific variables
As discussed in the introduction, previous research has shown that the positive bias
in analysts’ earnings forecasts is related to firm-specific information. For that reason
we include prior-year earnings growth, market capitalization, analyst coverage and
price-to-book ratio as control variables Sjt in our regression models. We obtain the
number of analysts providing earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S and collect market
capitalization and the price-to-book ratio from Standard and Poor’s (formerly IFC)
Emerging Markets Data Base (EMBD).
12
2.4.1 Prior-year earnings growth
Several previous studies explain the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts in terms of
misinterpretation of the information in prior-year earnings. De Bondt and Thaler
(1990) document that predicted earnings changes are more extreme than the corre-
sponding realized earnings changes, suggesting that analysts tend to overreact. By
contrast, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) present evidence that analysts underreact
to prior-year earnings information. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) reconcile these con-
flicting results by showing that analysts underreact to negative earnings news, but
overreact to positive news, such that analysts are systematically optimistic.
2.4.2 Market capitalization
The market capitalization of a stock, which we measure in US dollars, is an indication
of firm’s information environment. Information uncertainty is likely to be lower for
larger companies. Both Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Lim (2001) show that
analysts provide more accurate earnings forecast for larger firms. Therefore we
expect a negative effect of the log market value and the earnings forecast error.
2.4.3 Analyst coverage
The number of analysts following a company and providing earnings forecasts varies
widely across stocks. For example, highly volatile stocks are covered by more analysts
than average, while small caps are covered by relatively fewer analysts. Based on
the findings by Lim (2001) and Chan and Hameed (2006) we expect stocks with
higher coverage to have smaller forecast errors as the information environment for
such companies tends to be richer.
2.4.4 Price-to-book
Following Lim (2001) we also include the price-to-book ratio as control variable. Van
der Hart et al. (2005) show that a portfolio of high price-to-book stocks in emerging
markets has a smaller forecast error than a portfolio of low price-to-book stock during
the first 11 months after portfolio formation. Hence we expect companies with a low
price-to-book ratio to have a larger forecast bias.
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3 Empirical results
3.1 Summary statistics
- insert Table 1 about here -
Table 1 presents an overview of the distribution of the firm-year observations
across years and countries. The number of observations per year, which equals 673
on average, varies substantially over time. Starting relatively low at 97 in 1991, the
number of firms grows rapidly to around 950 in 1997/8. Due to the effects of the
Asian crisis and Russia crisis (in addition to countries such as Portugal and Greece
leaving the IFC Investable index) this declines to 586 in 2003, followed by a sharp
increase again during the final two years of the sample period. A similar pattern
occurs for most individual countries. We also observe a positive relationship between
country size and the number of observations per country, as expected. In terms of
data coverage, on average our sample includes 65 percent of the constituents of the
IFC Investable index, except for the first three years of the sample period during
which coverage is lower at around 43 percent.
- insert Table 2 about here -
Table 2 displays the mean and median earnings forecast error across countries and
across years. Consistent with previous research for developed markets, we find that
the overall average forecast errors are negative, suggesting that on average analysts
are too optimistic about future earnings. The magnitudes of the mean and median
errors of −5.2 and −0.5 percent, respectively, also are comparable to values typically
found for developed markets. For example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) report mean
and median errors of −1.93 and −0.32 percent for the US over the period 1982–1995.
It is worthwhile to consider the forecast errors during the emerging markets crises
that occurred during our sample period. For most crises we observe substantially
larger negative median forecast errors: −4.4 percent in Mexico during the 1994
(December) peso-crisis, −32 percent in Thailand during the 1997 (July) Asia crisis,
−48 percent in Russia during the 1998 (August) Russia crisis and −8.6 percent (−21
14
percent) during the Argentina crisis in 2001 (November) and 2002 (January). Recall
that most earnings forecasts in our sample were produced in June, prior to the crises’
occurrence. Hence, the excessive optimism during these years suggests that analysts
did not foresee these periods of turmoil. For the Turkey crisis in February 2001 we
do not observe a clear deviation from the historical pattern, suggesting that analysts
did incorporate negative earnings related news in their forecasts during this period
of larger economic uncertainty.
3.2 Firm-level earnings growth and actual macroeconomic
developments
Before examining the role of macroeconomic information in analysts’ earnings fore-
casts, we first consider the relationship between actual earnings growth and realiza-
tions of our three macroeconomic variables to determine whether and how firm-level
performance is related to macroeconomic performance in the first place. Specifically
we estimate the following regression:
Eit − Ei,t−1
Pit
= α+
∑
j
βjMjt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit, (6)
where Mjt are the realizations of our macroeconomic factors in year t. Panel A of
Table 3 presents robust estimation results for (6), as well as for regressions including
only one of the three macroeconomic variables.
- insert Table 3 about here -
We find significantly positive slope coefficients for all three macroeconomic vari-
ables, confirming prior expectations. The positive slope estimate for realized output
growth of 0.13 (t = 8.3) implies an earnings increase equal to 0.13 percent of eco-
nomic growth on average. The coefficient estimate of realized inflation, although
positive, is small at 0.02 (t = 8.7), suggesting a rather weak relationship between
inflation and nominal earnings in emerging markets. Finally, an increase in polit-
ical stability leads to a significantly positive effect on earnings growth, given the
coefficient estimate of 0.06 (t = 6.8).
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For the firm-specific information we observe a negative coefficient of the prior-year
earnings growth, equal to −0.13 (t = −16.6). This indicates a mean reversion effect
that is also documented by Easterwood and Nutt (1999) for earnings growth in the
US. The positive slope of 0.01 (t = 16.2) for the log market capitalization suggests
that relationship between size and nominal earnings is rather weak. The same applies
to analyst coverage and the price-to-book ratio with coefficient estimates of -0.00036
(t = −5.2) and 0.0011 (t = 7.6), respectively.
The fairly modest R2 at 7.53% indicates that the relationship between earnings
growth and macroeconomic developments in emerging markets is not particularly
strong. Nevertheless, these results indicate that analysts may benefit from incor-
porating macroeconomic information into their earnings forecasts. The question is
whether they indeed do this and if so, whether this is done in the best possible way.
3.3 Analysts’ efficiency
If analysts make optimal use of macroeconomic information for their earnings fore-
casts, the forecast errors should be uncorrelated with any information that is avail-
able at the time the forecasts are made. We examine this issue by estimating the
forecast error model in (2). We stress that we include the macroeconomic forecasts
as they were made in June of each year, coinciding with the six-month horizon used
for defining the earning forecast error such that this information is available at the
time analysts issue their earnings forecasts.
The results reported Panel B of Table 3 show a number of interesting features.
First and foremost, we obtain significant slope coefficients for two of our three macro-
economic variables. The positive coefficient estimates for the forecasts of output
growth and political risk of 0.07 (t = 4.1) and 0.02 (t = 2.2), respectively, indicat-
ing that analysts underestimate the effects of output growth and the change in the
politics on earnings growth. Analysts do incorporate inflation forecasts efficiently
in their earnings forecasts, given that its coefficient (-0.004, t = −1.4) is not signifi-
cantly different from zero.
Second, we find a significantly negative intercept equal to −5.7 percent (t =
−23.0), indicating that analysts are optimistic on average.
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Third, we find that the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts also varies system-
atically with the included firm characteristics. The positive coefficient estimate of
0.09 (t = 15.8) for the prior-year earnings growth indicates that analysts do not
efficiently take into account the information from last year’s earnings growth. We
note that this estimate resembles Easterwood and Nutt (1999)’s slope estimate of
0.13 (t = 15.29) and also is in line with Abarbanell and Bernard (1992)’s finding
of β1 of 0.08 (t = 3.30) for both US companies. Furthermore, we find a larger bias
for smaller companies, in line with the result for US stocks documented by Lang
and Lundholm (1996) and Lim (2001), and for an international sample of stocks by
Ang and Ciccone (2002). The larger bias for companies with a low price-to-book
ratio is also present in our dataset. Contrary to our expectations, we find a smaller
bias for stocks with low analyst coverage. This effect is statistically significant but
economically very small.
The above observations summarize our main results. Most importantly, we find
significant estimates for the coefficients of two of the macroeconomic variables. An-
alysts do not use information that is available in forecasts of output growth and the
political situation in emerging markets for their earnings forecasts in the best possi-
ble way. The information in inflation forecasts seems to be accounted for correctly.
3.4 Interaction between macroeconomic forecasts and earn-
ings forecasts
At first sight, our finding that earnings forecast errors are related to the output
growth and political risk forecasts seems to imply that analysts ignore valuable
macroeconomic information when producing their earnings forecasts for individual
companies. This is not necessarily true, however. An alternative explanation is that
these macroeconomic forecasts are incorporated into the earnings forecasts, but this
information actually is irrelevant for earnings growth. As discussed in Section 2 we
may shed light on the question which of these competing mechanisms is the relevant
explanation by regressing the realized earnings growth and the earnings forecasts
on the macroeconomic forecasts and firm characteristics, as given in (3) and (4),
respectively.
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The estimation results as shown in Panels C and D of Table 3 indeed provide
useful insights on this issue. First, for the inflation forecasts we find significantly
positive coefficients in both regressions of the actual earnings growth and the fore-
casts (0.03, t = 15.6 and 0.03, t = 9.4, respectively), which furthermore are of
comparable magnitude. Hence, the inflation forecasts do contain useful information
for actual earnings growth for emerging markets firms, and analysts incorporate this
information correctly in their forecasts.
The insignificant coefficient β3 = −0.0047 (t = −0.8) of the political risk forecast
in panel D suggests that analysts ignore changes in the emerging market’s political
situation in their earnings forecasts. Panel C, however, shows that the political risk
forecast is related to actual earnings, with a significantly positive coefficient equal
to 0.02 (t = 2.2). This implies that analysts would be able to improve their earnings
forecasts by taking this information into account, as also indicated by the significant
coefficient for the political risk forecast in panel B for the forecast error regression.
Finally, the most striking results are obtained for the output growth forecasts. We
find a significantly negative coefficient of −0.07 (t = −6.0) in the regression for the
earnings forecast, indicating that higher forecasts of output growth are accompanied
by lower earnings forecasts. This contradicts the positive relationship found between
realized earnings and output growth in panel A, so that analysts seem to respond to
this information in the wrong way. At the same time, the results in panel D point
out that there is no significant relationship between the output growth forecast
and realized earnings with a coefficient of 0.01 (t = 0.6). Hence, analysts better
ignore this information altogether for their earnings forecasts. This outcome confirms
O’Brien (1994)’s finding that macroeconomic news that arrives after the earnings
forecast issuance is reflected in the forecast error.
In sum, our findings indicate that analysts do not efficiently use the available
macroeconomic information represented by forecasts for output growth and the
change in the political situation in their earnings forecasts for emerging markets’
stocks. Analysts do incorporate the information represented by inflation forecasts
correctly. The political risk forecasts contain useful information for realized earn-
18
ings, but analysts ignore this completely. Output growth forecasts do not seem
useful sources of information for realized earnings. Analysts, however, ‘overreact’
and adjust their earnings forecast in the opposite way.
3.5 Transparency
As discussed in the introduction, earnings forecasting is closely related to the infor-
mation environment. We return to this issue in this section and examine whether
the role of macroeconomic information in analysts’ earnings forecast differs system-
atically according to the ease with which analysts may gain access to firm-specific
information. This builds upon the point made by Bae et al. (2006) that a firm’s trans-
parency may be an important factor determining analyst behaviour. Intuitively, if
the financial statements are limited and a firm provides little or no information about
its business operation’s outlook, analysts need to rely more upon macroeconomic in-
formation for producing an earnings forecasts. Macroeconomic information may
have little added value for companies that are more willing to disclose firm-specific
information and management expectations.
We investigate the role of the information environment by distinguishing between
companies with high and low transparency, according to two measures. First, we
split our sample into stocks with and without ADR’s, following the suggestion of
Lang et al. (2003) and Baker et al. (2002). Our second measure of transparency is
the time that it takes a company to release its annual report: stocks releasing their
annual report within three months after the end of the prior fiscal year are labelled
as ‘fast reporting’, and all other stocks as ‘slow reporting’. To the best of our
knowledge, this second transparency measure has not been examined before. Both
measures are defined such that analysts know in advance if the stock is transparent
given either its ADR listing or its prompt release of the prior-year annual report.
The ADR identifier comes from the Factset Pricing database. This database
contains firm-level information about the start and end dates of an ADR cross-
listing. Our sample includes 2161 firm-year observations that have an ADR listing
when the earnings forecasts are issued. We obtain the fiscal year-end date as well
as the publication data of the annual report from the I/B/E/S database. In total
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we have 3522 fast-reporting firm-year observations. For both measures it holds that
the distribution of transparent companies in our sample is fairly uniform across
countries, sectors as well as calendar years. This is important as it implies that
the following analysis truly measures transparency at the firm level instead of, for
example, transparency at the country level.
- insert Table 4 about here -
Table 4 shows the results for the regressions allowing for different coefficients
for transparent and non-transparent firms. The results for the forecast error regres-
sion in panel B provide convincing evidence that analysts’ handle macroeconomic
information more efficiently for transparent companies, irrespective of which trans-
parency measure is used. For fast-reporting firms, only the political risk forecast is
significantly related to the forecast error, while all three macroeconomic forecasts
are significant for slow-reporting firms. The positive coefficients for the latter group
of companies furthermore suggest that analysts underreact to the information in the
forecasts for inflation, output growth and political risk. For ADR stocks, we even
find that none of the macroeconomic forecasts is statistically significant, while for
non-ADR stocks the output growth and political risk forecasts are, and again with
positive coefficients. The results in panel C demonstrate that the output growth
forecast is relevant for neither transparent nor non-transparent companies’ earnings
growth. For the inflation and political risk forecasts, the results partly depend on
the transparency measure that is used to classify firms. For ADR stocks we find that
the political risk forecast bears useful information for earnings growth and the infla-
tion forecast does not, while the opposite is found for fast-reporting firms. For both
non-ADR stocks and slow-reporting firms we find significantly positive coefficients
for both these macroeconomic forecasts.
Overall we conclude that analysts handle macroeconomic information in a better
way for more transparent companies. This confirms the finding of Lim (2001) for US
stocks that analysts’ earnings forecast bias is related to the information uncertainty
environment, and in fact expands it by documenting this effect for macroeconomic
forecasts.
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4 Robustness
In this section we report results from a number of additional analyses, intended to
check the robustness of our main finding that analysts do not optimally account for
macroeconomic information in their corporate earnings forecasts.
4.1 Crises
Our robust estimation technique ascertains handling of outliers. Although this ap-
proach has several desirable features and has been used by others like Chan and
Lakonishok (1992) or Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), a potential concern
is that crises still might influence our results. To address this issue explicitly we
distinguish between firm-years in normal and in crises periods and consider the role
of macroeconomic information for these sub-samples separately. In total we iden-
tify 391 firm-year observations in crisis periods: the Mexican peso crisis in 1994,
the Asian crisis in 1997/1998, the Russian debt crisis in August 1998, Argentina’s
default at the end of 2001 and Turkey’s currency crisis in 2001.
Estimating the four regression models in (2), (3), (4) and (6) allowing for differ-
ent coefficients during crises and ‘normal’ periods renders estimates as reported in
Table 5. Reassuringly, the results of the earnings forecast error in normal markets
are largely comparable with the results for the complete data set. In particular, an-
alysts underestimate the effects of output growth and changes in political stability
during normal periods, with significantly positive coefficients in panel B that are
very close to those found for the complete sample. The estimates of the correspond-
ing coefficients in panels C and D also confirm the earlier finding that output growth
forecasts do not carry relevant information for earnings growth while political risk
forecasts do. Analysts treat these forecasts wrongly, in the sense that they do in-
corporate output forecasts in their earnings forecasts but ignore the political risk
forecasts. Interestingly, the coefficient of the inflation forecast in normal markets
in the forecast error regression is more than double the coefficient for the complete
sample at −0.0085 compared to −0.0039, and is significantly different from zero
with a t-statistic of −3.0. This indicates that analysts overestimate the effect of
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inflation on earnings growth when constructing their earnings forecasts. This is also
borne out by the estimates in panels C and D, showing that the inflation forecast
coefficient is considerably larger in the regression of the earnings forecast than of the
realized earnings growth.
The results for the crisis periods also are noteworthy. From panel B we observe
that the earnings forecast errors are not significantly related to our three macroeco-
nomic forecasts. Panels C and D indicate that analysts correctly account for the
inflation forecast, which bears useful information for earnings growth, and rightfully
ignore the non-informative output growth and political risk forecasts.
We conclude that our primary results are confirmed after controlling for the crisis
periods: analysts do not efficiently incorporate macroeconomic information into their
earnings forecasts during normal market circumstances.
4.2 Country, sector and year effects
Next, we verify the relevance of country-specific macroeconomic information for
earnings forecasts, rather than global macroeconomic or sector-specific information.
This is done by limiting the regressors in (2) to the stock-specific characteristics
and including different types of dummy variables instead of the macroeconomic
forecasts. First, we consider the relative importance of year, country and sector
effects by including a set of corresponding dummies. For constructing the sector
dummies we use the MSCI sector classification. The year dummies can tentatively
be interpreted as representing a global macroeconomic factor, such as US output
growth or inflation, impacting all emerging markets earnings equally. The other two
types of dummies cover structural differences across countries and sectors. Second,
we jointly include year and country dummies or year and sector dummies. Third and
of most interest, we include country-year or sector-year dummies. These dummies
should shed most light on the question if macroeconomic effects are important for
explaining analysts’ forecast bias. The year-country dummies have a clear economic
interpretation as they can be considered as proxies for time-varying country-specific
macroeconomic information. In fact, year-country dummies provide the most perfect
macroeconomic factor, such that the R2 of this regression provides an upper bound
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on the explanatory power than we can attain with specific macroeconomic variables.
The year-sector dummies can be interpreted as sector-specific factors that change
over time, such as the oil price for the energy sector or the price of semiconductors
for the IT sector. A comparison of the adjusted-R2 of the regressions with these two
types of dummies should demonstrate whether the country-based approach taken
in our paper is justified, or whether a sector-based approach would have been more
appropriate.6
Table 6 reports the R2’s for the different dummy regressions, obtained with
the robust estimation method. It can be seen that the individual time, country
and sector effects are approximately equally important with R2 values of 2.31, 2.04
and 1.89 respectively. The R2 of 6.05 percent for the year-country dummies more
than doubles the R2 of 2.95 percent obtained for the specification with year-sector
dummies, clearly suggesting that the country-based macroeconomic approach taken
here is indeed appropriate.
4.3 Macroeconomic exposures per year and per country
As a final robustness check, we explore how the information content of macroeco-
nomic forecasts varies over time and across countries. Ciccone (2005) reports a
steady decrease in analysts’ earnings forecast errors for US stocks over the period
1990-2001. This motivates us to explore if and how the information content of macro-
economic forecasts varies over time for our sample of emerging market firms. We
examine this issue by estimating the forecast error model (2) for individual calendar
years. If analysts indeed have become more efficient over time the relationship be-
tween macroeconomic forecasts and earnings forecast errors should weaken for more
recent years.
Table 7 displays the regression results for the forecast error model for each in-
dividual calendar year. These suggest that analysts’ earnings forecasts consistently
are inefficient and have not improved in recent years. Especially information in
6A more technical point is that in order to avoid multicollinearity we impose that the dummy
coefficients sum to 0, such that they measure the deviation from the overall intercept, see also
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1995), for example.
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prior-year earnings growth is not taken into account correctly, as its coefficient is
significantly positive for 10 out of 15 years, with no indications that this effect weak-
ens over time. It seems that analysts assess the information concerning the political
situation better over time, as the earnings forecast errors are uncorrelated with the
change in political risk during the last four years of our sample period, in contrast
to the significantly positive coefficient for earlier years. This is not the case for in-
flation and output growth, for which we still find a significantly positive relationship
with the forecast error in the (prior) last year of our sample period. Also note that
analysts’ reaction to the inflation and output growth forecasts varies substantially
over time. For some years (1996, 1997) we find evidence for underreaction (as the
coefficient is negative), while for other years we find evidence for overreaction (given
the positive coefficient). In contrast to the US results reported in Ciccone (2005) we
conclude that analysts’ inefficiency of earnings forecasts for emerging markets does
not weaken during more recent years.
- insert Table 7 about here -
Finally, we examine if the value of macroeconomic information varies across
countries. Table 8 explores the cross-country heterogeneity in the properties of
earnings forecast errors. For 23 countries the individual R2 of the regression in (2) is
higher than the R2 obtained with the complete sample, in particular for the Czech
Republic, Russia and Egypt. The estimation results reveal a considerable amount of
heterogeneity for the macroeconomic variables, as the coefficients of both output and
political risk forecasts are significantly positive and negative for an equal number
of countries (five and six, respectively). The same applies to the inflation forecast,
as its coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero for 7 countries and
significantly negative for 10 countries. Apparently these effects cancel out when the
forecast errors are pooled across countries, given that we do not find a significant
effect of the inflation forecast when the model is estimated for the complete sample.
- insert Table 8 about here -
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Overall, we conclude that our results are robust over time but show consider-
able heterogeneity across countries. It would be interesting to examine whether the
cross-country differences in the effects of the macroeconomic forecasts can be related
to, for example, differences in the transparency and disclosure regulations and prac-
tices of the financial markets in the different emerging markets, see Bae et al. (in
press). This would show whether transparency at the country level also affects the
role of macroeconomic information for analysts’ earnings forecasts, in addition to
transparency at the firm level documented in Section 3.5. This, however, is beyond
the scope of the current paper and is left for future research.
5 Conclusion
We present empirical evidence that analysts do not make efficient use of publicly
available macroeconomic information when producing earnings forecasts for emerg-
ing market firms. We show that analysts do incorporate macroeconomic forecasts
in their earnings forecasts, but in a sub-optimal way. Analysts show strong signs of
underreaction to political stability forecasts and overreaction to output growth fore-
casts. The forecasts on political stability are completely ignored ignored by analysts,
while these provide valuable information for firm-level earnings growth. Analysts do
incorporate output growth forecasts, but these actually bear no relevant informa-
tion for firm-level earnings growth. Hence, analysts better ignore this information
altogether for their earnings forecasts. Inflation forecasts are taken into account
appropriately. These results are robust to controlling for several firm characteris-
tics, including prior-year earnings growth, market value, analyst coverage and the
price-to-book ratio.
In addition we show that firm transparency determines analyst behaviour as we
document analysts’ earnings forecasts to be more efficient for transparent stocks.
We distinguish between transparent and non-transparent stocks based on either the
availability of an ADR listing (following Lang et al. (2003)), or the publication of the
annual report within three months after the fiscal year end. For both measures of
transparency we find that analysts correctly take into account (all) macro economic
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forecasts as well as the prior-year earnings growth. This result confirms Bae et al.
(2006) and Lim (2001)’s conclusion that analysts’ earnings forecast bias is related
to the information uncertainty environment.
Overall our findings suggest the usefulness of macroeconomic forecast information
in earnings forecasts for emerging market companies. We offer analysts, as well as
investors, insight how to improve earnings forecasts. Companies, on the other hand,
can facilitate analysts in their earnings forecasts by increasing their transparency,
for example by publishing their annual reports promptly after the fiscal year end.
In addition, our findings provide evidence on the importance of political stability in
emerging markets. Countries benefit from increased political stability in terms of
higher earnings growth.
Future research could consider the role of macroeconomic information in individ-
ual analysts’ earnings forecasts. More specifically we suggest to look at the difference
between local analysts and foreign analysts. Bae et al. (in press), for example, find
that local analysts have an economically and statistically significant advantage over
foreign analysts. It would be interesting to examine whether the use of macroeco-
nomic information also differs between domestic and foreign analysts. Furthermore,
we have implicitly assumed a specific (quadratic) loss function for analysts and a
constant relation between macroeconomic information and earnings forecasts over
time and across countries. Following Basu and Markov (2004) and Rodriguez (2005)
a closer look at the effect of these assumptions may provide more empirical evidence
for analysts’ inefficiency in emerging markets earnings forecasts.
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Appendix: Huber’s Generalized M-estimator
Robust estimation techniques are a convenient method to guard against the influence
of aberrant observations. In this appendix we briefly describe the Generalized M-
estimator (GM) employed in this paper in the context of a linear regression model
yi = xiβ + εi, i = 1, . . . , n, (7)
where β is an unknown parameter and εi are independently distributed errors. A
GM estimator of the linear regression coefficient β can be defined as the solution to
a weighted least squares equation defined by the first order condition
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ)xiwr(ri) = 0, (8)
where ri denotes the standardized residual, ri ≡ (yi − xiβ)/(σεwx(xi)) with σε a
measure of scale of the residuals and wx a weight function that is bounded between
0 and 1. The weight functions wr(·) and wx(·) are chosen in such a way that i-
th observation receives a relatively small weight if either the regressor xi or the
standardized residual (yi − xiβ)/σε becomes large, such that the outlier does not
influence the estimates of β and σε.
The weight function wr(ri) is specified in terms of the Huber (1981) ψ function
as wr(ri) = ψ(wr)/ri for ri 6= 0 and wr(0) = 1. The Huber ψ function is given by
ψ(rt) =

−c if rt ≤ −c,
rt if −c < rt ≤ c,
c if rt > c,
(9)
The tuning constant c determines the robustness and efficiency of the estimator.
We use the commonly used value of 1.345 for c as the resulting estimator has an
efficiency of 95% compared to the OLS estimator in case the errors εi are normally
distributed. We use the same function to define the regressor weights wx(xi).
The use of the weighted least squares estimator implies that the coefficient of
determination for the original data, R2WLS has different characteristics than usual.
Most importantly, the R2WLS can become negative. For this reason we follow the
suggestion of Verbeek (2002) and define the R2 as the squared correlation between
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the actual values yi and the fitted values yˆi = xiβˆGM, where βˆGM denotes the GM
estimate of β.
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Table 3: The importance of macroeconomic forecasts
Panel A: Realized earnings growth and realized macroeconomic factors
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP −0.04 0.14 −0.11 0.01 −3.37 14.34 0.119
(−15.27) (9.22) (−14.67) (14.29) (−5.11) (15.03)
CPI −0.04 0.02 −0.13 0.01 −3.45 14.86 0.083
(−15.31) (6.89) (−15.74) (14.29) (−5.20) (10.40)
POL −0.03 0.06 −0.11 0.01 −2.87 15.08 0.113
(−13.63) (8.26) (−15.22) (14.25) (−4.91) (11.44)
Multivariate
−0.05 0.13 0.03 0.06 −0.14 0.01 −3.56 11.08 0.075
(−16.87) (8.27) (8.68) (6.78) (−16.61) (16.20) (−5.23) (7.63)
Panel B: Earnings forecast errors and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP −0.06 0.07 0.09 0.01 −2.40 19.91 0.017
(−24.22) (4.18) (16.51) (18.23) (−4.27) (15.03)
CPI −0.05 −0.01 0.09 0.01 −2.00 22.11 0.016
(−24.02) (−3.26) (16.01) (17.53) (−3.57) (16.35)
POL −0.05 0.02 0.09 0.01 −1.80 19.37 0.018
(−25.95) (2.79) (15.96) (18.37) (−3.64) (17.02)
Multivariate
−0.06 0.07 −0.00 0.02 0.09 0.01 −2.20 20.33 0.019
(−22.98) (4.07) (−1.39) (2.16) (15.76) (17.94) (−3.86) (15.45)
(continued on next page)
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Panel A: C: Earnings realizations and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP −0.03 −0.02 −0.11 0.01 −3.14 16.61 0.113
(−11.62) (−1.28) (−12.65) (13.90) (−4.73) (11.18)
CPI −0.04 0.03 −0.13 0.01 −3.29 15.01 0.079
(−15.62) (8.89) (−15.70) (15.74) (−4.93) (10.44)
POL −0.03 0.01 −0.11 0.01 −3.11 15.58 0.111
(−13.35) (1.60) (−14.16) (14.20) (−5.32) (11.81)
Multivariate
−0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 −0.13 0.01 −3.32 14.19 0.077
(−13.95) (0.58) (9.37) (2.16) (−16.16) (15.69) (−4.88) (9.80)
Panel D: Earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP 0.03 −0.09 −0.20 −0.00 −0.78 −5.32 0.168
(20.01) (−9.08) (−32.63) (−4.86) (−2.24) (−7.49)
CPI 0.02 0.03 −0.22 −0.00 −1.32 −8.39 0.136
(12.06) (17.69) (−34.12) (−0.35) (−3.82) (−11.15)
POL 0.02 −0.01 −0.20 −0.00 −1.24 −5.74 0.169
(19.38) (−3.16) (−33.70) (−4.23) (−4.02) (−9.01)
Multivariate
0.02 −0.07 0.03 −0.00 −0.23 −0.00 −1.10 −7.30 0.143
(13.26) (−6.01) (15.60) (−0.79) (−35.25) (−1.21) (−3.09) (−9.77)
Note: This table presents estimation results for the regressions involving macroeconomic forecasts
and firm characteristics
Yit = α+ β1ĜDP t + β2ĈPIt + β3P̂OLt+
γ1
(
Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2
Pi,t−1
)
+ γ2MCAPit + γ3COVit + γ4PBit + εit,
where ĜDP t is the forecast of real GDP growth in year t, ĈPIt is the forecast of consumer
price inflation in year t, and P̂OLt is the forecast of the change the political risk in year t. All
macroeconomic forecasts are made six months prior to the end of year t. Eit is the realized
earnings per share in local currency for firm i in fiscal year t, and Pi,t−1 is the local stock price
six months into year t − 1 such that (Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2)/Pi,t−1 is the actual earnings change in
fiscal year t − 1. MCAPit, COVit and PBit are the log market capitalization in US dollar, the
number of analysts covering the stock and the price-to-book ratio, respectively, all measured six
months before the end of year t. The dependent variable Yit is either the earnings forecast error
FEit = (Eit − Êit)/Pit, where Êit is the consensus analysts’ earnings forecast made six months
prior to the end of the year (Panel B), the actual earnings change (Eit − Ei,t−1)/Pit (Panel C),
and the earnings forecast (Êit − Ei,t−1)/Pit (Panel D). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the
the actual earnings change (Eit − Ei,t−1)/Pit, while the macroeconomic forecasts are replaced by
the corresponding realizations. Regressions under the heading ‘Univariate’ include only one of the
three macroeconomic variables. The coefficient estimates for COVit and PBit are multiplied with
10,000. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels
are marked with one, two and three asterisks, respectively. All samples comprise 10,102 firm-year
observations from 29 different emerging market countries.37
Table 4: Transparency and the importance of macroeconomic forecasts versus earnings
forecast errors
Panel A: Realized earnings growth and realized macroeconomic factors
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non-ADR −0.05 0.13 0.03 0.07 −0.14 0.01 −2.62 12.77
0.072
(−13.74) (6.48) (9.55) (6.64) (−15.46) (12.16) (−3.10) (8.41)
ADR −0.08 0.26 −0.01 0.16 −0.29 0.02 −5.95 18.78
(−3.59) (2.12) (−1.42) (2.23) (−3.25) (3.87) (−1.83) (1.64)
Fast reporting
SLOW −0.05 0.15 0.03 0.07 −0.14 0.02 −5.23 11.99
0.067
(−13.71) (6.27) (10.81) (5.71) (−13.86) (12.70) (−5.24) (6.01)
FAST −0.16 0.66 0.01 0.32 −0.52 0.05 −7.67 15.53
(−2.65) (1.68) (2.73) (2.52) (−3.92) (3.20) (−1.94) (1.88)
Panel B: Earnings forecast errors and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non-ADR −0.06 0.05 −0.00 0.02 0.08 0.01 −1.60 20.01
0.020
(−19.84) (2.33) (−0.11) (2.01) (13.94) (14.91) (−2.24) (14.16)
ADR −0.16 0.17 −0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 −0.67 24.78
(−5.55) (1.16) (−1.04) (1.50) (0.27) (5.66) (−0.28) (2.99)
Fast reporting
SLOW −0.07 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.02 −2.43 22.75
0.021
(−18.82) (2.71) (2.05) (3.56) (14.69) (14.28) (−2.78) (11.59)
FAST −0.29 0.41 −0.00 −0.19 −0.00 0.08 −9.65 9.63
(−6.07) (1.32) (−0.74) (−2.40) (−0.03) (6.20) (−2.60) (1.83)
(continued on next page)
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Panel C: Earnings realizations and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non ADR −0.04 −0.02 0.03 0.02 −0.14 0.01 −2.42 15.15
0.075
(−11.33) (−0.75) (9.46) (1.65) (−15.02) (12.23) (−2.89) (10.06)
ADR −0.07 −0.05 −0.00 0.18 −0.28 0.02 −5.50 21.27
(−2.93) (−0.34) (−0.28) (2.53) (−3.14) (3.85) (−1.63) (1.80)
Fast reporting
SLOW −0.04 −0.01 0.04 0.04 −0.14 0.02 −4.30 14.83
0.065
(−11.27) (−0.33) (10.06) (2.74) (−13.63) (12.34) (−4.39) (7.56)
FAST −0.17 0.40 0.02 −0.12 −0.52 0.05 −12.43 13.03
(−2.40) (0.85) (2.69) (−1.09) (−3.88) (2.99) (−2.50) (1.75)
Panel D: Earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non ADR 0.02 −0.07 0.03 −0.01 −0.24 −0.00 −0.93 −6.75
0.142
(12.33) (−5.30) (14.44) (−1.52) (−32.05) (−2.39) (−2.13) (−8.44)
ADR 0.09 −0.22 0.05 0.09 −0.29 −0.02 −4.85 −3.43
(4.42) (−2.29) (1.23) (1.68) (−7.83) (−3.12) (−1.83) (−0.45)
Fast reporting
SLOW 0.02 −0.09 0.04 −0.01 −0.27 −0.00 −1.99 −8.87
0.136
(10.67) (−5.57) (13.00) (−1.71) (−34.18) (−0.53) (−3.69) (−7.93)
FAST 0.12 −0.00 0.02 0.07 −0.52 −0.03 −2.79 3.40
(2.14) (−0.01) (3.28) (1.62) (−5.28) (−2.31) (−0.86) (1.09)
Note: This table presents estimation results for transparent and non-transparent stocks. Rows labelled
‘ADR’ (‘Non-ADR’) indicate the sub-sample of stocks with (without) an ADR cross-listing in the US.
Rows labelled ‘Fast’ (‘Slow’) indicate the subsample of stocks that publish their annual report before
(after) three months after the fiscal year end. See table 3 for further details.
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Table 5: Crises and the importance of macroeconomic forecasts versus earnings forecast
errors
Panel A: Realized earnings growth and realized macroeconomic factors
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal −0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 −0.14 0.01 −1.91 8.14
0.114
(−13.37) (4.18) (7.53) (2.72) (−17.06) (14.22) (−2.73) (5.81)
Crisis −0.88 0.64 0.01 0.58 −0.80 0.25 −17.59 321.77
(−4.86) (0.95) (2.32) (1.19) (−5.58) (4.13) (−0.53) (6.32)
Panel B: Earnings forecast errors and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal −0.05 0.06 −0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 −1.13 16.36
0.091
(−21.01) (3.37) (−3.03) (2.03) (13.81) (16.76) (−1.94) (12.99)
Crisis −1.05 −0.90 −0.00 0.98 −0.10 0.31 0.19 225.93
(−6.62) (−1.26) (−0.29) (1.59) (−0.96) (6.05) (0.01) (4.52)
Panel C: Earnings realizations and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal −0.03 −0.03 0.02 0.02 −0.14 0.01 −1.65 9.97
0.111
(−10.76) (−1.44) (6.87) (1.67) (−16.71) (13.72) (−2.36) (6.97)
Crisis −0.97 0.08 0.02 0.35 −0.79 0.28 −23.37 328.04
(−5.09) (0.08) (2.42) (0.45) (−5.46) (4.40) (−0.71) (6.22)
Panel D: Earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal 0.02 −0.09 0.03 −0.01 −0.22 −0.00 −0.54 −7.39
0.136
(14.55) (−7.73) (13.97) (−1.09) (−34.18) (−2.47) (−1.40) (−9.60)
Crisis 0.08 0.98 0.02 −0.63 −0.69 −0.04 −23.57 102.11
(0.74) (1.55) (2.29) (−1.24) (−4.89) (−1.00) (−1.12) (3.75)
Note: This table presents estimation results for normal market periods and crisis periods. Rows la-
belled ‘Normal’ and ‘Crisis’ indicate the sub-sample of stocks during normal market periods and crises
(1994 Peso crisis in Mexico; 1997-1998 Asia crisis in Thailand (start), Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Philippines; 1998 Russia’s default; 2001 Turkey crisis and 2001-2002 Argentina default and currency
crisis), respectively. See table 3 for further details.
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Table 7: The importance of macroeconomic forecasts per calendar year
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
1991 −0.05∗ 0.63∗ 0.04 0.21∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 −7.79∗ −0.73 0.12
1992 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.05 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗ 15.61∗∗∗ 0.02
1993 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.02∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.05 0.01∗ 1.17 15.65∗∗∗ 0.11
1994 −0.02∗∗ −0.15 −0.00∗ −0.14 −0.05 0.01∗∗∗ −6.43∗∗ 10.71∗∗ 0.00
1995 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.06 0.00 0.04∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 1.97∗ 15.55∗∗∗ 0.04
1996 −0.02∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.03 0.04∗ 0.00∗∗ 6.41∗∗∗ 17.60∗∗∗ 0.01
1997 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 0.04 0.01∗∗∗ −3.67 43.77∗∗∗ 0.04
1998 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.10 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.09 0.37∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.62 65.67∗∗∗ 0.01
1999 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.06 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −5.21∗ 32.83∗∗∗ 0.04
2000 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.04∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.42 21.96∗∗∗ 0.02
2001 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 8.37∗∗∗ 44.94∗∗∗ 0.07
2002 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ −4.64 41.97∗∗∗ 0.00
2003 −0.02 0.16 0.01 −0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.25 −10.11∗ 0.02
2004 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.02 0.13∗∗ 0.06 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −2.53 −16.30∗∗∗ 0.01
2005 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.02 −0.03 0.02 0.02∗∗∗ −1.85 14.52∗∗∗ 0.06
Note: This table presents estimation results for the regression of the earnings forecast error on
the macroeconomic forecasts and firm characteristics
FEit = α+ β1ĜDP t + β2ĈPIt + β3P̂OLt+
γ1
(
Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2
Pi,t−1
)
+ γ2MCAPit + γ3COVit + γ4PBit + εit,
for each individual calendar year. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%
and 1% significance levels are marked with one, two and three asterisks, respectively. See Table
3 for variable definitions.
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Table 8: The importance of macroeconomic forecasts per country
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Argentina −0.05∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.05 −0.06 0.00 13.34∗∗∗ 37.17 0.01
Brazil −0.05∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.03∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −3.59 56.66∗∗∗ 0.02
Chile −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.01∗∗∗ −13.03∗∗∗ 25.09∗∗∗ 0.09
China −0.03∗∗ 0.03 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −7.23∗∗∗ 11.79 0.11
Colombia −0.16∗ 1.19 0.46 −0.07 0.05 −0.01 34.59 75.61 0.21
Czech Rep. −0.05 −0.45 −0.27∗ −0.13 0.29∗∗∗ 0.02 2.02 44.77 0.70
Egypt −0.15∗∗∗ −3.64∗∗∗ 4.75∗∗∗ 0.22 −0.01 0.03 85.41∗∗ −87.54∗∗∗ 0.50
Greece 0.11∗∗∗ −2.83∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ 0.05 0.21∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.69 28.84∗∗∗ 0.14
Hungary −0.08∗∗∗ −0.83∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ −0.05 0.20∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −5.48 −15.76 0.22
India −0.06∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.11∗∗ −0.05∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −9.05∗∗∗ 8.05∗∗∗ 0.14
Indonesia −0.04∗∗ −0.15 −0.05 0.21∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −5.63 15.49∗∗∗ 0.19
Israel −0.04∗ 0.34 0.11 −0.09 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 −15.96 19.59 0.05
Korea −0.12∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.20∗ 0.02 0.02∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗ 43.55∗∗∗ 0.07
Malaysia −0.02∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.14∗ −0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.85 5.63∗∗∗ 0.20
Mexico −0.09∗∗∗ 0.13 0.11∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.03 0.02∗∗∗ −11.74∗∗∗ 87.54∗∗∗ 0.05
Pakistan 0.01 −0.48 −0.47∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.03 0.00 59.57∗ 52.49∗∗ 0.10
Peru −0.02 0.93∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.01 −31.46∗∗∗ 38.43 0.12
Philippines −0.11∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗ −0.16 0.05 0.30∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −25.03∗∗∗ 43.17∗∗∗ 0.17
Poland −0.16∗∗∗ −0.32 0.40∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −21.33∗∗ 72.66∗∗∗ 0.19
Portugal 0.02 −0.17 −0.56∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.01 −13.34∗∗∗ 16.43∗ 0.04
Russia −0.72∗∗∗ 5.77∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ −0.03 0.07∗∗∗ −33.10 −132.49∗ 0.50
Slovakia −0.71 8.70∗∗∗ 5.04 −16.71∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ −0.05 −67.56 1009.56 0.36
S. Africa −0.02∗∗ 0.05 −0.11∗∗ −0.01 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −13.98∗∗∗ 9.17∗∗ 0.01
Taiwan −0.06∗∗∗ 0.05 0.16 −0.04 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ −6.51∗∗ 30.61∗∗∗ 0.08
Thailand −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.32∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −15.97∗∗∗ 13.30∗∗ 0.00
Turkey −0.03∗∗ 0.09 −0.02 0.02 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −17.62∗∗∗ 10.67∗∗∗ 0.07
Venezuela −0.09 0.38 0.30∗∗∗ 0.80∗ 0.18∗∗ −0.02 39.93 −298.10∗∗∗ 0.34
Note: This table presents estimation results for the regression of the earnings forecast error on the
macroeconomic forecasts and firm characteristics
FEit = α+ β1ĜDP t + β2ĈPIt + β3P̂OLt+
γ1
(
Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2
Pi,t−1
)
+ γ2MCAPit + γ3COVit + γ4PBit + εit,
for each individual country. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels are marked with one, two and three asterisks, respectively. See Table 3 for variable
definitions.
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic forecasts and realizations
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Note: The graphs in this figure show scatterplots of forecasts and realizations for GDP growth,
CPI inflation and the change in political risk, as well as the fit of a regression of the
macroeconomic realization on a constant and the corresponding forecast. For the CPI inflation
regression the observations for Brazil in 1993 and 1994 are omitted, when realized inflation was
2477% and 916%, respectively.
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